This is a hypothetical attack, since the actor must try every possible key existing in the "space" (the maximum length of a key) to break the encryption. For instance, if an algorithm has 256-bits keys, the number of possible keys should be 2256 or, on a decimal base, almost 1276 combinations. Unlike the general concept, the main problem related to this attack is not only the necessary computational power, but the energy cost spent on this process versus the actual value of the information to be recovered. And we are not talking about only the energy spend by processors and memory, but all the thermodynamics involved in that hefty data processing.

Interestingly, note that today, attackers have many resources at their disposal to make this attack simpler (and cheaper): from cloud-based clustered GPUs to small powerful and cheaper computers that consume little power or even custom FPGA chips to work specifically with some mathematics, greatly optimizing both computational power and power consumption. But it is essential to say that, even today, professional and military algorithms resist this onslaught because of the cost (and time) required to fill the key space.

But one question remains: for how long this barrier will persist? And this question leads us to others:

- Is the NSA (and other military or government structures) incapable of doing this work?

- What about quantum computing, a computational resource that will compromise any asymmetric key based on prime or curve numbers in a very short time?

So, it would be interesting for an algorithm to consider these risks and be ready to resist them - and nowadays, we have already seen some "quantum-resistant" algorithms being implemented for encryption purposes (but still not entirely to the key exchange).

Considering these questions, OBAKE-512 was developed using a quantum-resistant scheme based on huge symmetric keys and variable P-Box/S-Box. Also, like most secret algorithms (like those used in military communication to submarines and jet fighters), we prefer to keep our algorithm hidden from the general public, adding another layer of security to any attacker or cryptanalyst.*

Regarding to our keys, we utilize six varying from 32 to 65535 bits, in different round schemes and having one-time random ones. Remember: each key space exponentials the previous keys spaces, so if considering an hipotethic 6 keys of 32 bits, we would have 232*32*32*32*32*32 or 2 1.073.741.824 , an virtual infine number - try yourself to calculate it!

These procedures makes any bruthe-force attack completely impractical.

This type of attack on the OBAKE application and the OBAKE-512 algorithm is mostly impractical.

* If necessary, our code can be audited by any volume-based client (above 1000 licenses), using a confident third-party elected by both companies (ours and yours) with the total cost under the client's exclusive responsibility and subjected to specific rules as described on specific NDA to be signed for all involved parties.